Recent Phases of Fraudulent Drainage by G., R. B.
Volume 45 Issue 4 Article 8 
June 1939 
Recent Phases of Fraudulent Drainage 
R. B. G. 
West Virginia University College of Law 
Follow this and additional works at: https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr 
 Part of the Oil, Gas, and Mineral Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
R. B. G., Recent Phases of Fraudulent Drainage, 45 W. Va. L. Rev. (1939). 
Available at: https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol45/iss4/8 
This Student Note is brought to you for free and open access by the WVU College of Law at The Research Repository 
@ WVU. It has been accepted for inclusion in West Virginia Law Review by an authorized editor of The Research 
Repository @ WVU. For more information, please contact ian.harmon@mail.wvu.edu. 
STUDENT NOTES
RECENT PHASES OF FRAUDULENT DRAINAGE
Fraudulent drainage is a concept used to describe a particular-
ly heinous kind of removal of oil or gas by a lessee from beneath the
lessor's land. In and of itself there is no fraud in the drainage.'
One property owner, in fact, may drill as close to his neighbor's
line as he pleases, take oil or gas from his neighbor's land and in-
cur no liability whatsoever for the taking either on the basis of
fraud or wrongful taking.
2
Fraudulent drainage occurs, however, where the lessee of a
tract kmowingly drains off the oil or gas through a well operated
by the same lessee on an adjoining tract. The fraud of the lessee
consists of exercising control of the mineral rights in such a man-
ner as to deprive the lessor of royalties or rents to which the lessor
would be entitled if the oil and gas were taken out by a well on his
land.3 Proof of drainage under such circumstances will be con-
sidered as fraudulent drainage irrespective of any dishonest intent
on the part of the lessee.'
Once fraudulent drainage is established, certain remedies at
law and in equity are available to the lessor in West Virginia. He
may sue at law for damages for breach of the implied covenant,"
bring action in equity for cancellation of the lease either partially
or totally on the theory of implied condition, or seek specific per-
formance of the implied covenant to protect from drainage by drill-
ing offset wells. 7 It has been held that acceptance of delay rentals
for a period barred any action during the period by the lessor for
I See Simonton, Has a Landowner Any Property in Oil and Gas in Place?
(1921) 27 W. VA. L. Q. 281.
2 THORNTON, OiL & GAS (1932) § 518; Barnard v. Monongahela Gas Co.,
216 Pa. 362, 65 At.. 801 (1906).
3 Lamp v. Locke, 89 W. Va. 138, 108 S. E. 889 (1921) ; Hall v. South Penn
Oil Co., 71 W. Va. 82, 76 S. E. 124 (1912).
4 Brewster v. Lanyon Zinc Co., 72 C. C. A. 213, 140 Fed. 801 (C. C. A.
8th, 1905); Dillard v. United Fuel Gas Co., 114 W. Va. 684, 173 S. E. 573(1934).
r Steele v. American Oil Dev. Co., 80 W. Va. 206, 92 S. E. 410, L. R. A.
1917E 975 (1917); Harness v. Eastern Oil Co., 49 W. Va. 232, 38 S. E.
662 (1901); Core v. New York Petroleum Co., 52 W. Va. 276, 43 S. E. 128(1902).
0 Adkins v. Huntington Dev. & Gas Co., 113 W. Va. 490, 168 S. E. 366 (1932).
7Lamp v. Locke, 89 W. Va. 138, 108 S. E. 889 (1921). Note: This case is
the only instance in West Virginia where the remedy of specific performance
without option of cancellation has been applied.
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ordinary drainage.8 Subsequent decisions, however, have indicated
that the delay rental is compensation for delay and not for des-
truction: hence, in the event of fraudulent drainage, acceptance
of the rentals does not bar or waive the lessor's right of action."
The Necessity of Substantial Drainage.-It is thus definitely
settled in West Virginia that the lessor may have redress for
fraudulent drainage, 10 but the question of just how serious the
drainage must be, before relief will be granted, has not until recent-
ly been clearly marked. out. The first requisite is, of course, proving
that the drainage actually is occurring." Certainly if the amount
is of a serious or great extent no question could be raised to the
right of the lessor to relief in some form or other. On the other
hand, it might be manifestly unfair to allow a drastic remedy such
as specific enforcement of an implied covenant when the drainage
is slight or barely appreciable.. It then becomes necessary to find
a line of demarcation which will serve as a basis for the rights of
both parties.
The problem presented is squarely met by the comparatively
recent case of Trimble v. Hope Gas Company." In that litigation
the lessor sought to force the lessee to drill additional offset wells to
protect the lessor's land from alleged fraudulent drainage and also
to have the lessee shoot and "pocket-drill" the offset well which had
already been drilled. It was conceded by the operator that there
might be a slight amount of drainage from under the lessor's land
through wells operated by lessee on adjoining land; but it was
pointed out in briefs of counsel for the operator that the loss to
the lessor from drainage was slight compared to the extreme cost
to lessee of drilling additional wells to prevent such drainage. 14 In
reversing the decision of the trial chancellor ordering the operator
to drill additional wells, the court held that the implied covenant
against drainage was confined to substantial drainage and did not
apply to relatively slight drainage. The opinion further held that
8 Carper v. United Fuel Gas Co., 78 W. Va. 433, 89 S. E. 12, L. R. A. 1917E
975 (1916). Although no mention is made of fraudulent drainage in the
opinion, See Note (1934) 40 W. VA. L. Q. 72-73, as to the fraudulent drainage
involved in the case.
9 Trimble v. Hope Natural Gas Co., 113 W. Va. 839, 169 S. E. 529 (1933).
10 See SUMM.ERS, On. & GAS (1938) § 455, and cases cited. Note (1937)
43 W. VA. L. Q. 147, 149.
:1 The burden of proving substantial drainage is on the lessor. See Goodwin
v. Standard Oil Co., 290 Fed. 92 (C. C. A. 8th, 1923).
" Hall v. South Penn Oil Co., 71 W. Va. 82, 76 S. E. 124 (1912).
1' 117 . Va. 650, 187 S. E. 331 (1936).
14 Reply Brief for Appellant, p. 4, ibid.
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matters pertaining to the drilling of oil and gas wells and to the
producing of oil and gas are primarily within the sound discretion
of the operator.1 It is possible that the decision could have reached
the opposite result without involving any strained conclusion by
the court. On the same reasoning that even slight eviction of a
tenant by the landlord will result in relieving the tenant from any
burdens under the lease,"6 so it might have been held that slight
fraudulent drainage would work at least a forfeiture of the lease.
1
7
In a technical sense, even slight drainage by the operator could be
considered such a breach of the lessee's obligation of loyalty as to
justify relief for the landowner.
It is submitted that the decision in the Trimble case is a sound
solution of the problems of fraudulent drainage for several reasons.
First and foremost should be the consideration of the cost of drill-
ing. It would seem to be a harsh result if an operator could be
forced to expend some thousands of dollars drilling a well which
would never justify its cost merely to prevent a slight drainage
from the lessor's land and the resultant loss of an inconsequential
sum of money in royalties or rents.' s Another consideration which
justifies the rule of the case is the danger that requiring offset drill-
ing to prevent bare appreciable drainage might result in over-
production and add to the problems of waste and depreciation of
natural resources. '" It is also clear that substantial drainage may
be proved more on a factual basis than slight drainage, proof of
which tends more toward a conjectural proof which is difficult for
the courts.20 The test of any legal rule is its workability and the
requirement of substantial drainage makes the relief sought more
readily applicable by the courts. Another good feature of the
result in the Trimble case is that the rule laid down for relief in
"' See on this point Notes (1922) 19 A. L. R. 437, (1929) 60 A. L. R. 950,
and cases cited.
16 Mfiller v. Southern Ry. Co., 131 Va. 239, 108 S. E. 838 (1921).
'7 Dillard v. United Fuel Gas Co., 114 W. Va. 684, 688, 173 S. E. 573 (1934).
The court in this case quotes with approval from the case of Lamp v. Locke,
89 W. Va. 138, 108 S. E. 889 (1921). the following: "IA lessee in the opera-
tion of his lease must act in good faith. Where he owns adjoining land he
has no right, under the guise of ownership to drain the land leased by putting
down wells on the adjoining property, without sinking offset wells on the
lease sufficient to protect it from such draining, when the lessor is entitled to
royalties in the oil, or gas taken from the leased premises."
'5 Austin v. Ohio Fuel Oil Co., 218 Ky. 310, 291 S. W. 386 (1927).
10 Preston, Begulation of the Natural Gas Industry (1939) 45 W. VA. L. Q.
250, 257.
20 Trimble v. Hope Natural Gas Co., 117 W. Va. 650, 658, 187 S. E. 331
(1936).
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fraudulent drainage is brought into line with the law on drainage
generally, which is that there must be substantial drainage proved
before the operator's implied covenant to protect the landowner
may be invoked."' Thus, there is one test and only one test for
drainage whether it be fraudulent or not, namely, the existence
of substantial drainage.
The Operator's Control as to Drilling Methods.-Presuming
that an offset well is drilled either by the operator of his own volition
or by court order, the question of whether or not it is being done
in the proper manner may become important. Needless to say,
if the well is of an offset nature, it must protect the land from
the drainage. 22  Beyond this requirement, the details of location
and drilling should be largely left up to the operator as these are
primarily questions of operation and not of right.2
There is obviously the danger that an operator forced to drill
an offset well may not put forth his best efforts in the development.
Unless there were some check or supervision on the manner of
doing the work the operator could conceivably be unskilled, care-
less and by inefficient operation ruin the producing sands. On the
other hand, as has been pointed out in the preceding paragraph,2
the tremendous investment which the operator has in the drilling
and operation of a well, will, to a large extent, act as an insurance
to the lessor that the development will be properly carried out.
Much modern production is to the deeper sands, involving expendi-
tures of sums like thirty thousand dollars per well; and it can
hardly be argued that in drilling such a well the lessee would not
take adequate precautions to protect himself and incidentally the
lessor. The work of drilling for oil and gas is a highly technical and
specialized operation. It would be absurd to permit the lessor to
instruct the drilling crew as to how the work should be done.
When determining whether or not an oil and gas operation is
being properly conducted, the courts have held the lessee to a
standard of reasonable diligence under the circumstances.2 1 In
setting up this standard the courts have adopted two tests. Under
21 Hart v. Standard Oil Co., 146 La. 885, 84 So. 169 (1920); Hall v. South
Penn Oil Co., 71 W. Va. 82, 76 S. E. 124 (1910); Eastern Oil Co. v. Beatty,
71 Okla. 275, 177 Pac. 104 (1915) ; Stanley v. United Fuel Gas Co., 78 W. Va.
796, 90 S. E. 344 (1916).
22 Colgan v. Forest Oil Co., 194 Pa. 234, 45 Atl. 119 (1889).
23 Allen v. Colonial Oil Co., 92 W. Va. 689, 115 S. E. 842 (1923).
24 Reply Brief for Appellant, p. 4, Trimble v. Hope Natural Gas Co., 117
W. Va. 650, 187 S. E. 331 (1936).
25 Hall v. South Penn Oil Co., 71 W. Va. 82, 76 S. E. 124 (1910).
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one test the judgment of the lessee is considered as final in the
absence of an affirmative showing of fraud or bad faith. 2 The
care which would be exercised by a reasonably prudent man under
the circumstances is the test followed in several jurisdictions. 7
While at one time, the West Virginia court apparently adopted
the latter test,28 the general policy of the court has been to use the
former and in the last Trimble case the court clearly adopted that
test when it said:
"Matters pertaining to the drilling of oil and gas wells,
and to the producing of oil and gas are primarily within the
sound discretion of the operator. It is he who carries the
hazard, and the burden of the cost. As long as his procedure
is in accord with standard methods he will not be interfered
with by the courts." 29
The net result of the holding in the Trimble case is that in the
drilling and operation, the operator may proceed as he thinks best;
the only check will be an affirmative showing that his actions are
fraudulent and in bad faith. This result is fundamentally sound,
although there should possibly be a limitation on the rule.3" It is
conceivable that considerations of market for the production, desire
to make advantageous purchases in the neighborhood and other
matters might influence the operation so that the lessor might not
receive justice. However, the seven-eighths interest the operator
has in the well will assure that application of the rule laid down
will not result in injustice to the lessor. 1
The new doctrines in fraudulent drainage as laid down in the
Trimble case are frankly intended to protect the operator. Em-
phasis is properly placed on the risks taken by the operator. Be-
cause of the hazards and uncertainties of the oil and gas business,
West Virginia courts have adopted the attitude of refusing to aid
the lessor unless there is a clear showing of serious loss. Such a
20 Ammons v. South Penn Oil Co., 47 W. Va. 610, 35 S. E. 1004 (1900);
Core v. New York Petroleum Co., 52 W. Va. 276, 43 S. E. 128 (1903); Union
Gas & Oil Co. v. Diles, 200 Ky. 188, 254 S. W. 205 (1923).
-7 Texas Pacific Coal & Oil Co. v. Barker, 117 Tex. 418, 6 S. W. (2d) 1031,
60 A. L. R. 936 (1928); Hart v. Standard Oil Co., 140 La. 885, 84 So.
169 (1920).
28 Jennings v. Southern Carbon Co., 73 W. Va. 215, 80 S. E. 368 (1913);
see SummERS, Om & GAS § 416, n. 59.
29 Trimble v. Hope Natural Gas Co., 117 W. Va. 650, 664, 187 S. E. 331
(1936).
30 On this point see Note (1929) 7 Tx. L. REv. 438.
31 Texas Pacific Coal & Oil Co. v. Stuard, 269 S. W. 482 (Tex. Civ. App.
1925).
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policy could at least be in harmony with the judicial tendency
favoring the coal industry. Viewing the problem from the angle
of the interest of the state as a whole, these rules are eminently
proper: they will accomplish the purpose intended, namely, further
development of the oil and gas industry to the deeper producing
sands.
R. B. G.
THE SCOPE OF WEST VIRGINIA LEGITIMATIZING
STATUTESO
At common law only those children born or conceived in lawful
wedlock are legitimate1 and under early common law the illegiti-
mate child had no right of support, of inheritance or even of a
name.2  Legislators have done much to alleviate the condition of
illegitimate offspring, by enacting statutes declaring the child to
be legitimate and statutes conferring rights of inheritance upon
him. These statutes based on natural justice and on the natural
affections of the human heart have radically altered the position
of these unfortunates and brought American law into substantial
conformity with the Civil and Canon Law.3
Virginia was among the first states to enact legislation designed
to mitigate the harsh rules of the common law. In 1776 the General
Assembly appointed a Committe of Revisors4 to prepare changes
in the existing legal system and to Thomas Jefferson5 fell the task
of drafting the Law of Descents. The Revisors' Report was sub-
*Including W. VA. REv. CODE (Michie, 1937) c. 42, art. 1, § 5, which does
not legitimate but gives rights of inheritance through the mother.
1VERNIER, AMERICAN FAMILY LAWS (1936) 148; MADDEN, PERSONS &
DOESTIc RELATIONS (1931) 348; Robbins and Deak, Familial Property
Bights of Illegitimate Children: A Comparative Study (1930) 30 COL. L. REV.
348.
2 See MADDEN, op. cit. supra n. 1, at 348; Robbins and Deak, supra note 1,
at 310; Note (1932) 45 HARV. L. REV. 778.
31 BL. Comm. '454; Note (1916) 18 CoL. L. REV. 698; Note (1932) 45
HAZv. L. REV. 778. See Davis v. Rowe, 6 Rand. 355, 367 (Va. 1828); Garland
v. Harrison, 8 Leigh 368, 371 (Va. 1837).
49 HEN. STAT. (1821) 175 (Thomas Jefferson, Edmund Pendleton, George
Wythe, George lason, and Thomas Ludwell Lee were appointed on this com-
mittee but only the first three named participated in the actual work). See 1
WRITINGS op THOMAS JEFFERSON (Mem. ed. 1903) 62-67.
5 2 WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON (Ford's ed. 1893) 195; 1 WRITINGS
OF THOMAS JEFFERSON (Mem. ed. 1903) 461; Davis v. Rowe, 6 Rand. 355,
373 (Va. 1828).
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